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VALUE 
Value generally refers to the aIllount of 
Illoney or other goods that lllust be paid to 
obtain sOlllething. There are nonetheless a 
nUIllber of very different value concepts, 
and in particular there is considerable dif-
ference betw"een the "Ways in "Which eco-
notnic sociology and orthodox econolllics 
treat the concept of value. In contrast, 
betw"een econolllic sociology and hetero-
dox econotnics there are significant COlll-
lllonalities regarding the treatlllent of the 
concept of value. The differences date back 
to the origins of sociology and classical 
econotnics, and persist or have perhaps 
become sharper betw"een contelllporary eco-
nomic sociology and neoclassical econOlll-
ics. The commonalities betw"een economic 
sociology and heterodox economics have 
eIllerged particularly since the 1 980s. 
In the history of sociology, value has 
been treated as a property of entire social 
systellls, such as "When it is associated "With 
the concept of culture by Max Weber, one 
of the early founciers of sociology: The 
concept of culture is a value concept. 
Empirical reality becomes 'culture' to us 
because and insofar as "We relate it to value 
ideas (Weber 1949: 76). 
On this vie"W, our interest in reality is a 
function of the values "Which culture 
eIllbodies, that is, our interest in the "World 
is a 'value-conditioned' one. SOllletiIlles 
termed the 'values approach to culture', it 
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has been argued that such an approach 
treats culture monolithically as singularly 
shaping 'action by supplying ultimate ends 
or values to "Wards "Which action is directed' 
(S"Widler 1986: 273). This perspective is to 
be compared "With the concept of value in 
classical econotnics of Adalll Smith and 
David Ricardo, "Where the concept con-
cerns a set of relationships that obtain 
"Within a systelll in the form of commodity 
prices or exchange values. As SIllith puts it: 
'The value of any commodity ... is equal 
to the quantity of labour "Which it enables 
hilll to purchase-or cOlllmand. Labour ... is 
the real llleasure of the -exchangeable value 
of all cOIlllllodities' (Smith 1976: 47). 
Here, value is not an ultiIllate end to"Wards 
"Which action is directed, but rather the 
effect of action involved in the "Work 
required to extract objects of consulllption 
frOIll nature. 
Emile Durkheim criticized SIllith's clas-
sical value theory explanation in terIllS of 
labour input by arguing that it missed the 
central dimension of the concept of value. 
Value understood in terlllS of labour con-
tent appears as if it "Were sOIllething entirely 
objective and impersonal. But Durkheilll 
argued that such a conception overlooks 
the role of social opinion in determining 
value, particularly in determining notions 
of just value (Durkheim 1992). This sallle 
critique, it should be noted, can be exten-
ded to neoclassical value theory in that it 
also treats value as lllarket price, though 
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rather as detennined by objective and 
impersonal forces of supply and demand. 
Durkheim's argument vvas framed primarily 
in terms of the value of labour, and vvhile it 
might be applied to the value of consumer 
and other types of goods, he focused on 
arguing that the vvage rate depends upon 
social standards regarding the minimum 
resources needed to sustain to survival, that 
these standards vvere set by public opinion, 
and that they changed from period to per-
iod. HOVlTever, Smith, David Ricardo and 
even more strongly Karl Marx each held in 
varying degrees similar vievvs regarding the 
social determination of the vvage. And since 
for each of them the value of other com-
modities depended upon the value of 
labour, this implies that their values also 
possessed a social component. 
Durkheim's critique, hOVlTever, is more 
successful in regard to the neoclassical vievv 
of the VlTage as determined by the marginal 
productivity of labour in production and in 
regard to the neoclassical vievv of price in 
general as market-determined. The mar-
ginal productivity of labour is a schedule of 
outputs made possible by incremental 
increases in labour input. Its level reflects 
the quantity of capital employed by labour, 
VlThere both labour input and the capital 
employed are described in natural units: 
hours of labour and a certain quantity of 
machines and equipment. While one might 
say that social standards and public opinion 
implicitly underlie these values, rarely do 
these considerations enter into standard 
analysis. Much the same can be said about 
the explanation of price in general in neo-
classical economics .. Consumers play an 
important role in determining market price, 
but consumer preferences are taken as 
given and unchanging (Stigler and Becker 
1977), so that their social determinants may 
be disregarded. Even more strongly, 
revealed preference price theory (Samuel-
son 1948), vvhich most mainstream econo-
mists novv take as the standard explanation 
of choice, makes the very content of pre-
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ferences irrelevant to consumer choice. 
More generally, the formalist character of 
ITluch recent economics reinforces the 
notion that value as price lacks any social 
characteristics VlThatsoever. 
In contrast, heterodox traditions in eco-
nomics, particularly AITlerican institutional 
economics and social economics, hold 
vievvs of value reminiscent of Weber's vievv 
that value is a property of entire social sys-
tems and Durkheim's conception of market 
values as socially influenced. American 
institutional economists Thorstein Veblen, 
John Commons, John Maurice Clark and 
others make central institutions seen as 
'settled habits of thought common to the 
generality of men' (Veblen 1919: 239). 
Social economics, vvith origins in Simonde 
de Sismondi, Karl Marx, Leon Walras, 
Joseph Schumpeter, John Hobson and 
John Maurice Clark, see the social econ-
omy as encompassing the market economy, 
so that social values and vvorldvievvs 
permeate markets and underlie consump-
tion, production and distribution. Other 
heterodox approaches, such as Marxist 
economics, feminist economics, some eco-
logical economics approaches and post-_ 
Keynesian economics, are similarly holistic, 
historically oriented, critical of the nat-
uralism and positivism in economics, and 
reject the atomistic individualism of neo-
classical economics. The last is a key point 
of tangency betvveen heterodox economics 
and economic sociology and a key differ-
ence betvveen orthodox economics and 
economic sociology. Just as Georg Simmel, 
in his important early study The Philosophy 
of Money (1978), identified related types of 
individuals (such as the spendthrift and the 
miser) according to their linked positions in 
an economic system governed by money, 
radical and Marxist economists see indivi-
duals as socially connected through their 
ITleITlbership in classes and social groups 
• that interact vvithin systems of pOVlTer, vvhile 
feminist economists see gender relation-
ships in the economy as constitutive of 
individuals' econonuc roles and econonuc 
prospects. 
Interestingly, economic sociology enjoyed 
a revival in the 1980s, a period in "Which 
heterodox economics "Was also undergoing 
considerable development. While crossover 
relationships bet"Ween the t"Wo have been 
limited, they have nonetheless appear to 
have each follo"Wed certain parallel path-
"Ways that may be seen to derive from a 
shared critique of the assumptions of neo-
classical economics. Even more interest-
ingly, economic sociology and heterodox 
economics appear to share broad outlines of 
a vie"W of individuals as socially embedded 
a fa Karl Polanyi, and of individuals and 
society as mutually influencing. Thus, 
parallel to economic sociologist Mark 
Granovetter's influential characterization 
of individuals' embeddedness in terms of 
being neither undersocialized nor over-
socialized (Granovetter 1985), there is cri-
tical realisITl, a recent heterodox research 
programme combining a number of differ-
ent heterodox approaches, that employs a 
structure-agent conception of society in 
"Which individuals both influence and are 
influenced by social structures (La"Wson 
1997), and also a rene"Wed interest in the 
evolutionary themes of Veblenian institu-
tional economics, that emphasizes up"Ward 
and do"Wn"Ward causation operating bet"Ween 
individuals and institutions (Hodgson 2004). 
The 1980s also signal the beginnings of 
change in mainstream economics, "With the 
emergence of a collection of ne"W research 
programmes that bear limited resemblance 
to neoclassical economics and each other. 
These ne""W research programITles have 
almost all originated outside economics, 
thus not only importing modes of thinking 
often quite far removed from the traditional 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, but 
also reversing a period of economic 
imperialism "When the individual rationality 
assumptions of neoclassical economics "Were 
re-applied outside of economics. Game 
theory comes from mathematics, and chal-
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lenges the notion that economic individuals 
are isolated from one another by examining 
their interaction in games. In place of 
value as market price, value in game the-
ory is understood in terms of sets of alter-
native payoffs "Which depend upon ho""W 
players anticipate each other's choices. Non-
cooperative, one-shot games bear many of 
the features of the neoclassical economic 
view of the individual, but repeated games 
and cooperative games introduce a variety 
of considerations regarding play that make 
social structure central. Another ne""W 
research programme, behavioural econom-
ics, ""With origins in psychology, has focused 
on re-examination of neoclassical rational 
choice theory. Among its results, demon-
strated repeatedly in experimental studies, is 
that economic individuals often cooperate 
rather than behave In a self-interested 
manner. Additionally, individuals' deci-
sion-making appears to reflect heuristic 
cognitive bias (use of rules of thumb rather 
than rigorous analysis) and different kinds 
of decision-framing effects associated "With 
habits, 'herd mentality' and emotional 
attachments. For e-xoarnple, valuation can be 
influenced by strong feelings of regret 
individuals have regarding the loss of spe-
cially prized goods. Yet a third ne"W research 
programme, evolutionary economics, 
including evolutionary game theory, "With 
origins in Dar"Winian biology, has multiple 
currents, some overlapping "With game the-
ory and behavioural economics. Here, 
investigation first focused on evolutionary 
change in economic systems, and value is 
modelled as the frequency-dependent fit-
ness of different survival strategies in popu-
lations over time. Subsequent investigation 
replaces this biological emphasis ""With the 
idea of cultural evolution of beliefs and 
norms, and value is modelled in terms of 
the 'fitness' of these beliefs and norms to 
promote some generally useful good. These 
ne"W research programmes in mainstream 
economics mayor may not converge on 
the value themes that have characterized 
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economic sociology (and heterodox eco-
nomics) in the future. While sorne currents 
in recent economics give prorninence to 
social value concepts, others appear to be 
guided more by natural science and fonn-
alist ideas. On the "W"hole, ho"W"ever, recent 
economics is a far rnore eclectic theoretical 
undertaking than neoclassical economics, 
particularly as reflected in the fonner's 
departures frorn the latter's linked postu-
lates of value understood as Illarket price 
and individuals understood as isolated 
beings. Thus, "W"hereas there reIllain clear 
differences between economic sociology and 
neoclassical econorrllcs regarding the con-
cept of value, "W"hether these differences "W"ill 
persist between the fonner and econorrllcs 
as it ernerges in the future remain to be seen. 
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VEBLEN, THORSTEIN 
Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) "W"as a het-
erodox Arnerican econoIllist "W"ho laid the 
intellectual foundations of American insti-
tutional economics. The son of N o r"W"e gian 
iIllrrllgrants, Veblen studied at Carleton 
College, John Hopkins University, Yale 
University ("W"here he received a PhD in 
philosophy) and Cornell University ("W"here 
he did graduate "W"ork in econorrllcs). In the 
course of a chequered acadeIllic career, he 
held teaching positions at the University 
of Chicago (1892-1906), Stanford Uni-
versity (1906-9), the University of Missouri 
(1911-18) and'the N e.~_ School for Social 
Research (1918-26). Closely attuned to intel--
lectual developments in a broad range of 
academic disciplines and national contexts, 
Veblen incorporated into his economic 
"W"ritings concepts and theories frorn con-
temporary research in psychology, ethnol-
ogy and the biological sciences, as part of a 
determined effort to bring econoIllics in 
step "W"ith the "W"idely respected evolutionary 
sciences of his era. 
Entering econoITlics "W"hen the field "W"as 
ernbroiled in controversies between so-
called orthodox approaches and challenges 
froITl traditions such as the GerIllan histor-
ical school, Veblen sharpened and elabo-
rated the critique of orthodox classical and 
neoclassical economic theory. At the saIlle 
tiITle, he upbraided exponents of the his-
torical school for 'content[ing] theITlselves 
"W"ith an enumeration of data [and failing] to 
